

§ 452.47

candidate on the basis of personal characteristics which have a direct bearing on fitness for union office. A union may, for example, require a minimum age for candidacy. However, a union may not establish such rules if they would be inconsistent with any other Federal law. Thus, it ordinarily may not limit eligibility for office to persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin since this would be inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.²⁸ Nor may it establish a general compulsory retirement age or comparable age restriction on candidacy since this would be inconsistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. A union may not require candidates for office to be registered voters and to have voted in public elections during the year preceding their nominations. Nor may it require that candidates have voted in the previous union election to be eligible. Such restrictions may not be said to be relevant to the members' fitness for office.

[53 FR 8751, Mar. 17, 1988, as amended at 53 FR 23233, June 21, 1988]

§ 452.47 Employer or supervisor members.

Inasmuch as it is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for any employer (including persons acting in that capacity) to dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organization, it follows that employers, while they may be members, may not be candidates for office or serve as officers. Thus, while it is recognized that in some industries, particularly construction, members who become supervisors, or contractors traditionally keep their union membership as a form of job security or as a means of retaining union benefits, such persons may not be candidates for or hold office.²⁹ Whether a restriction on officeholding by members who are group leaders or

²⁸ *Shultz v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Association*, 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1262 (C.A. 3 1972).

²⁹ See *Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Association*, 118 NLRB No. 19 (1957). See also *Local 636, Plumbers v. NLRB*, 287 F.2d 354 (C.A. D.C. 1961).

29 CFR Ch. IV (7-1-10 Edition)

others performing some supervisory duties is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances. For instance, if such persons might be considered "supervisors"³⁰ under the LMRA, their right to be candidates under the Act may be limited. Another factor in determining the reasonableness of a ban on such persons is the position (if any) of the NLRB on the status of the particular employees involved. If, for example, the NLRB has determined that certain group leaders are part of the bargaining unit, it might be unreasonable for the union to prohibit them from running for office. An overall consideration in determining whether a member may fairly be denied the right to be a candidate for union office as an employer or supervisor is whether there is a reasonable basis for assuming that the person involved would be subject to a conflict of interest in carrying out his representative duties for employees and rank and file union members.

[38 FR 18324, July 3, 1973, as amended at 39 FR 37360, Oct. 21, 1974]

§ 452.48 Employees of union.

A labor organization may in its constitution and bylaws prohibit members who are also its full-time non-elective employees from being candidates for union office, because of the potential conflict of interest arising from the employment relationship which could be detrimental to the union as an institution.

§ 452.49 Other union rules.

(a) Unions may establish such other reasonable rules as are necessary to protect the members against leaders who may have committed serious offenses against the union. For example,

³⁰ Under section 2(11) of the Labor Management Relations Act, supervisors include individuals "having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."

a union may, after appropriate proceedings, bar from office persons who have misappropriated union funds, even if such persons were never indicted and convicted in a court of law for their offenses. Of course, the union would have to provide reasonable precautions to insure that no member is made ineligible to hold office on the basis of unsupported allegations and that any rights guaranteed him by the constitution and bylaws are protected. Similarly, a union may require an elected officer to sign an affidavit averring that he is not barred from serving as an officer by the provisions of section 504 of the Act since the union and its officers may not permit a person to serve as an officer if he is so barred (see footnote 23).

(b) It would not violate the Act for a union to prohibit successive terms in office or to limit the number of years an officer may serve. Such rules are intended to encourage as many members as possible to seek positions of leadership in the organization.

§ 452.50 Disqualification as a result of disciplinary action.

Section 401(e) was not intended to limit the right of a labor organization to take disciplinary action against members guilty of misconduct. So long as such action is conducted in accordance with section 101(a)(5), a union may, for example, if its constitution and bylaws so provide, bar from office for a period of time any member who is guilty of specific acts, such as strike-breaking, detrimental to the union as an institution. However, if a union has improperly disciplined a member and barred him from candidacy, the Secretary may, in an appropriate case, treat him as a member in good standing entitled to all of the rights of members guaranteed by title IV.

§ 452.51 Declaration of candidacy.

A union may not adopt rules which in their effect discourage or paralyze any opposition to the incumbent officers. Therefore, it would not be a reasonable qualification to require members to file a declaration of candidacy several months in advance of the nomination meeting since such a requirement would have such effect and "serves no

reasonable purpose which cannot otherwise be satisfied without resort to this procedure."³¹

§ 452.52 Filing fee.

It would be unreasonable to require candidates for office to pay a filing fee because a fee limits the right of members to a reasonable opportunity to nominate the candidates of their choice and there is no objective relationship between the requirement and the ability to perform the duties of the office.

§ 452.53 Application of qualifications for office.

Qualifications for office which may seem reasonable on their face may not be proper if they are applied in an unreasonable manner or if they are not applied in a uniform way. An essential element of reasonableness is adequate advance notice to the membership of the precise terms of the requirement. A qualification which is not part of the constitution and bylaws or other duly enacted rules of the organization may not be the basis for denial of the right to run for office, unless required by Federal or State law.³² Qualifications must be specific and objective. They must contain specific standards of eligibility by which any member can determine in advance whether or not he is qualified to be a candidate. For example, a constitutional provision which states that "a candidate shall not be eligible to run for office who intends to use his office as a cloak to effect purposes inimical to the scope and policies of the union" would not be a reasonable qualification within the meaning of section 401(e) because it is so general as to preclude a candidate from ascertaining whether he is eligible and would permit determinations of eligibility based on subjective judgments. Further, such a requirement is

³¹ *Wirtz v. Local 30, IUOE*, 242 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. N.Y. 1965) reversed as moot 366 F.2d 438 (C.A. 2, 1966), reh. den. 366 F.2d 438.

³² *Wirtz v. Local Union 559, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America*, 61 LRRM 2618, 53 L.C. ¶11.044 (W.D. Ky. 1966); *Hodgson v. Longshoremen's Local 1655 New Orleans Dray Clerks*, 79 LRRM 2893, 67 L.C. ¶12.466 (E.D. La. January 5, 1972).